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Abstract-This paper stresses chronicity as an essential aspect of mental illness, and develops an analysis 
of the mental health services delivery problem in which chronicity plays a central role. This emphasis leads 
in turn to a discussion of the importance of “treatment quality” in determining long run health care costs. 
The paper focusses on two sources of inefficiency in the mental health services system: the possibility that 
there are local optima in services delivery cost functions, and the fact that separately-managed treatment 
centers are interdependent because the treatment practices of one affect the patient flows of others. A 
formal analysis of these problems is provided, supplemented by a simulation model that can provide a 
much more detailed description of outcomes and costs. Finally, there is a short discussion of the use of 
subsidization to offset the effects of interdependence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the literature in medical care economics 
focuses on the provision of episodic medical treat- 
ment, and not on care for chronic illness. This is a 
severe limitation in many branches of medicine, but 
it is particularly restrictive in the analysis of mental 
health care, for which chronicity is the rule rather 
than the exception. Moreover, the medical care litera- 
ture generally presumes the existence of more or less 
standardized treatment methods (possibly graduated 
in quality) with known consequences, or at least with 
known probability distributions defined over possible 
outcomes. In contrast, diagnosis in mental health areas 
is often quite uncertain, and treatments for similar 
disorders vary widely among institutions and among 
providers with different treatment philosophies. 
Chronicity imposes special economic burdens on 
any health care system. In the first place, it limits the 
potential of insurance for providing private care, 
because the expenses of future treatments are not 
insurable risks. In the second place, chronicity limits 
the private economic capacity of those who are 
afflicted, particularly in the case of mental illness. 
Thus, while a network of private and publicly sub- 
sidized private institutions has developed to meet 
needs for unanticipated episodic medical care, the 
chronically mentally ill are treated for the most part 
in public institutions and at public expense. Because 
of this, conventional competitive market analyses are 
probably less relevant to mental health care delivery 
than are discussions of the managerial problems of 
providing mental health care in the presence of 
exogenous demand and considerable uncertainty con- 
cerning both diagnosis and treatment effectiveness. 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the 
problem of “quality” of care and its implications for 
long run cost in the treatment of the chronically 
mentally ill. The focus is not on any single empirical 
aspect of mental health care, but is on the general 
problem of variations in the quality of services and 
its implications for health care costs in ge’neral. 
Although quality often arises as a variable in analyses 
of the demand for medical care (as in Feldstein [l]), 
the question of quality of care rarely arises in 
the literature on mental health. A few exceptions 
are found in the work of Conley [2, 31, Fein [4], 
May [5-71, McCaffree [8,9], Rubin [lo], and 
Weisbrod et al. [ 111, but even these provide only hints 
of the nature of the service-quality problem in this 
context. 
The image of a hospital or physician providing 
standardized services may be appropriate for certain 
routine medical problems, but it is not generally 
accurate, and in the case of mental health care, it is 
a dangerous oversimplification. Depending on their 
circumstances, patients with similar disorders may be 
treated by any one or more of a variety of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, or even 
paraprofessional volunteers, and it is clear that the 
character of the treatment will depend on which of 
these providers is involved and in what setting. The 
cost of treatment is similarly sensitive to the choice 
and variety of providers, and, although there may be 
dispute even on this point, one is inclined to regard 
the more expensive services as the ones which deliver 
the higher “quality”. 
The problem would be simplified if it were possible 
to treat quality decisions independently of quantity of 
service decisions, but interactions between these two 
aspects of service are important. In the case of 
chronic illness, quality of care may not only reduce 
the necessary duration of treatment, it is also likely 
to influence future treatment needs, by altering the 
frequency of recurrences, by altering the severity of 
future illness episodes, or by altering future durations 
of treatment. The possibility arises that if high quality 
of care has a great enough effect on future treatment 
needs, it may be possible to substitute quality for 
capacity, perhaps even to the point of reducing the 
overall cost of care. Weisbrod, in particular, suggests 
that this might be the case for community based 
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treatment settings (and Feldstein [l], provides a hint 
of the same possibility in more conventional hospital 
settings). A cost reduction may occur even if a 
“typical” mental patient is receiving frequent ser- 
vices, and is never discharged from the care system. 
For example, a change in inpatient treatment may 
reduce inpatient duration even if the patient is only 
transferred into a residential facility earlier than 
would otherwise have been the case. Although the 
patient remains under care, the dollars devoted to 
treatment have been reduced because of the lower 
cost of residential facilities. 
One might suppose that providers in the mental 
health care system would already have exploited 
opportunities to substitute quality for capacity, 
partly from a desire to reduce their own costs of 
delivering services and partly out of a desire to 
provide high quality services to their clients. There 
are several obstacles to effective quality delivery in 
mental health systems, however: 
Most providers have great difficulty in obtaining 
and assimilating the information on which the ideal 
quality decision should be based. Evaluation of the 
relationship between treatment character and over- 
all health care needs requires statistical analysis of 
patient populations (within diagnostic categories) 
that are larger than most providers encounter. 
Even if adequate numbers of patients were avail- 
able, the necessary statistical evaluations are un- 
likely. By training as well as by inclination, most 
mental health providers view their patients as 
individuals, each with individual problems and in 
need of individualized treatment, and this point of 
view often precludes the development of even 
elementary statistical evaluations of treatment 
effectiveness. 
Mental health delivery cost functions may appear 
to be minimized at certain quality levels even 
though much lower costs are obtainable at other 
points. A provider might actually experiment with 
small variations in quality to see how these 
changes affect costs, and if these experiments lead 
to increased costs, conclude that no further 
changes in the nature of treatment would be eco- 
nomically efficient. If the benefits from increased 
quality arise only if the increase is much larger than 
has been tried, day-to-day experience will not be a 
good guide to an optimal mix of services. 
The influence of quality over capacity is dynamic 
in character, and if it requires significant amounts 
of time for the benefits of increased quality to be 
realized, providers may fail to recognize them. 
The individual provider who raises service quality 
may not be the one who experiences the resulting 
reduced capacity cost. High-quality outpatient or 
residential care may serve primarily to reduce the 
clients’ needs for inpatient services, for example, 
and thus the cost benefits of the higher quality are 
received by institutions other than the ones that 
provided it. 
2. THE MENTAL HEALTH DELIVERY 
COST FUNCTION 
A “local” optimum is a state that appears to be 
best (according to some criterion) because small 
deviations from that state all lead to inferior out- 
comes. If small increases or decreases in treatment 
expenditures fail to be worthwhile on some 
benefit/cost criterion, it is natural to extrapolate from 
this experience to the conclusion that large deviations 
would be even less desirable. Such a conclusion is not 
logically necessary, and its acceptance may lead one 
to overlook the possibility that large changes in 
expenditures (either up or down) might bring about 
significant improvements in treatment performance. 
The possibility that experience with local optima 
might interfere with the achievement of a “global” 
optimum is one which is routinely acknowledged in 
decision theory, but it is not usually given extensive 
treatment because it often seems to involve special 
cases: unusual functional forms, or implausible cost 
conditions. In the analysis of quality/capacity substi- 
tution in mental health care, however, the possibility 
arises so naturally that one might expect it to be the 
general case. The nature of this possibility can be 
described with the very simple model described in this 
section. 
In practice, one observes a variety of different 
lengths of stay for different patients, and a complete 
description of the mental health care delivery prob- 
lem would require the analysis of a distribution of 
values for treatment duration. It is sufficient here, 
however, to represent this distribution with its ex- 
pectation, T, which represents the mean duration of 
stay for patients in a particular unit. If N new patients 
are admitted each day (N may be less than l), then 
the facility will be occupied by NT patients at any 
point in time. Normally, of course, the capacity of the 
facility would be maintained somewhat above this 
level in order to accommodate stochastic fluctuations 
in admissions and discharges. It is unnecessary to 
introduce this detail here, and so NT can be used as 
the available patient capacity of the unit. 
“Quality” is a difficult concept to define because it 
has so many aspects. In the first place, there are 
several different types of input that contribute to 
treatment quality, so that one should consider quality 
to be a vector of inputs rather than a single- 
dimensioned variable. In addition, the term is as 
often applied to the output of mental health service as 
it is to the inputs. Deliberate increases in length of 
stay may be interpreted to be increases in quality: if 
a patient is retained in an inpatient setting until 
he/she achieves a relatively high level of functioning, 
then the treatment might be regarded as of higher 
“quality” than another that discharged the patient 
earlier, even if the day-to-day ingredients of the two 
treatments are identical. 
It is sufficient for the purposes of this section to 
focus on inputs to quality and to standardize the 
output; the objects of study are then alternative ways 
of treating similar patients that ultimately may bring 
them to the same level of functioning. There are still 
many different kinds of input that contribute to 
treatment quality in this narrow sense. The elemen- 
tary model used here does not require much detail, 
however, and can be described adequately with a 
hypothetical idealized single-dimensioned variable Q. 
Lower case q will represent the price of one unit of 
this good per patient day. (For many purposes, it is 
convenient to normalize q to equal 1, so that Q is 
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simply dollars spent on quality). If the patients under 
treatment have an average capacity cost of P dollars 
per patient per day, then the total long run cost of 
operating the facility is PNT + qQNT dollars per 
day. 
There is naturally some service component in any 
provision of capacity, and so the definition of zero 
quality is essentially arbitrary. Define capacity alone 
to provide some minimal level of treatment and to 
produce a mean duration of stay of T, days. So long 
as the definition of minimal service quality does not 
change, it is possible to represent the dependence of 
T on values of Q through a function f(Q): 
T =f(Q, (1) 
where T, =f(O). 
If the output of treatment is standardized at some 
specified level of functioning, then improvements in 
service (apart from increased lengths of stay) will tend 
to reduce mean durations of stay. This implies that 
the function f(Q) has the property: 
.f’tQ,Go. (2) 
Many mental health practitioners believe that there 
is some threshold of care below which mental health 
service is quite ineffective; below this threshold, in- 
crements in quality would have less effect than they 
would if the basic level of service were higher. This 
implies that, at least over some range, increases in 
quality might be increasingly effective in reducing the 
duration of treatment. Eventually, however, this 
effect must begin to disappear. It is inevitable that 
diminishing returns will set in at some point; other- 
wise it would be possible to reduce T all the way to 
zero, and of course, that would imply no treatment 
at all. Indeed, it is likely that durations of stay could 
not be reduced below some fixed lower bound no 
matter how many quality resources were expended. 
All this leads to condition (3) below: 
There exists some Q ’ > 0 such that 
f”(Q) > 0 for all Q > Q’. (3) 
If C is defined to be total cost per admission, then: 
C = (P + qQ)f(Q). (4) 
When Q varies, total cost will respond according to 
the derivative: 
2 = (P + qQ)f’(Q) + d-(Q). (5) 
The first term on the right-hand side of eqn (5) is 
negative, reflecting the fact that money is saved as 
duration is reduced. The second term is positive, 
reflecting the cost of quality itself. Thus an increase 
in Q increases cost per admission in proportion to the 
length of time in treatment, f(Q), but the concomi- 
tant reduction in treatment days, f’(Q), reduces 
cost in proportion to the amount already being spent 
per day. The important possibility is that the cost 
saving component may become larger as Q is 
increased. When Q = 0, total cost is PT, and 
dC/dQ = Pf’(Q) + q T,. If q T, is large relative to the 
product Pf’(Q), then dC/dQ > 0, implying that in- 
creases in quality will bring about increases in cost. 
Unless the absolute value off’(Q) decreases sharply 
in response to increases in Q, however, the product 
(P + qQ)f’(Q) will become more strongly negative 
as Q becomes larger, while the abolute magnitude of 
f(Q) in the positive term diminishes. Eventually the 
sign of dC/dQ may be reversed, implying that now 
cost will be reduced by increases in quality. At large 
values of Q, of course, the condition p(Q) > 0 will 
reduce the magnitude of f’(Q) by so much that the 
sign of dC/dQ is reversed again, but before this has 
happened, total cost may well have fallen below PT,, 
which is the cost incurred when Q = 0. 
Unless the cost minimum does occur at Q = 0, the 
least-cost supply of quality, Q *, must satisfy the first 
and second order conditions (6) and (7) respectively: 
(P + qQ *)f’(Q *I + qf(Q *I = 0, (6) 
W-‘(Q*) + (P + qQ *,f”(Q *I > 0. (7) 
A general review of the types of cost function that 
can occur is provided by Fig. 1. One can distinguish 
four general forms (although more elaborate mix- 
tures of these are, of course, possible): 
I. Initially Declining. This is a uniformly convex 
function with the property that costs decline mono- 
tonically with increases in quality expenditure until 
the unique local minimum is achieved. 
II. Initially Rising, then Strongly Falling. This is a 
function that rises at first, but then falls enough for 
cost levels to be achieved that are below those at the 
O-quality level. 
III. Initially Rising, then Weakly Failing. This 
function is similar to II, except that costs do not fall 
back to the O-quality level. 
IV. Monotonically Rising. This, like Case I, is a 
uniformly convex function, but in this case, costs rise 
with all increases in quality. 
The distinction between a local and a global min- 
imum in Cases II and III arises because the cost 
function described by eqn (4) is not necessarily 
convex. The nonconvexity is due to the product form 
of the cost function. The existence of multiple optima 
would assume less importance were the nature of the 
function f(Q) well known in advance. If providers 
and provider managers were informed as to the 
precise relationship between treatment quality and 
treatment duration, they would have no difficulty in 
specifying the cost function and calculating the cost- 
minimizing level of quality for themselves. Un- 
fortunately, not only is this information unavailable, 
treatment effectiveness is a matter of considerable 
1 I I I I I I I I 
Treatment quality 
Fig. 1. Possible forms of the cost function. 
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controversy, and at the present level of knowledge, 
providers are not able to agree on even rough approx- 
imations to the values of f(Q) (beyond acknowl- 
edgement that f’(Q) is likely to be negative). As a 
consequence, practical experience is the only avail- 
able guide to effective service delivery, and since few 
would be willing to experiment with wide variations 
in quality expenditure, the lure of the local cost 
minimum would be hard to resist. 
3. EXTERNAL BENEFITS 
A second major impediment to efficient quality 
delivery stems from the fact that the cost reductions 
attributable to increased quality may not be received 
by the agency that makes the quality expenditure. If 
high quality outpatient care reduces the need for 
inpatient services, for example, decreases in overall 
mental health care costs may be associated with 
increases in outpatient costs, and the interests of 
those who pay for the health care system (through 
insurance or public funds) would not be consistent 
with the interests of outpatient providers. 
To the extent that individual providers do seek to 
restrain costs, there is an unambiguous bias toward 
the underprovision of quality from a system point of 
view. Suppose that patients are admitted to and 
discharged from each treatment center according to 
established and unchanging criteria for each level of 
impairment. Then the patient “demand” on any 
single provider or health care agency will depend on 
the quality choices of all providers-low quality 
offered by one agency will increase the need for 
services provided by others, while high quality will 
reduce the demands placed on others. This proposi- 
tion can be expressed formally: letting Qi represent 
the choice by agency i of quality per patient-day, the 
demands placed on an agency j will be a function of 
the vector of quality choices made by all n agencies: 
D,=f~(Q), where Q = Q,, . . . , Q,. (8) 
By the nature of the situation, one must retain 
counterparts to conditions (2) and (3): 
ao,= aQ, -f<(Q) < 0 for all j. (9) 
There exists Q ’ = Q; , . . . , QA such that: 
$$ =fl,(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0’. (10) 
I 
If each agency j faces a capacity cost given by Pj, 
then system costs are: 
C = $, (PI+ SQjlfjCB)~ (11) 
j=l 
and overall mental health care costs are minimized if 
the n quality choices satisfy: 
5 = (4 + qQi)f;(B) 
I 
+ c (P, + qQ,,_fi@> + d(P) = 0, (12) 
I#, 
forall i=l,...,n. 
The costs borne by agency i alone are given by 
C, = (P + qQ,)fj@), and if this provider responds 
only to these local costs, Qi will be chosen so as to 
minimize C,. That is, Qi will satisfy: 
~=(Pi+qQi).lj(n)+yl'(n)=O. (13) 
1 
If the strict inequality in eqn (9) holds, then it 
follows that satisfaction of eqn (13) will not lead to 
the satisfaction of eqn (12), but to the condition 
dC/dQ, < 0 instead. Thus each agent i will under- 
provide quality from the system point of view. 
4. THE PERSPECTIVE FROM 
SIMULATION 
The demonstrations of the possibility of inefficient 
quality delivery that have been given above have 
rested on general models that capture plausible as- 
pects of the mental health delivery process. Never- 
theless, these models do not have a firm quantitative 
base. The state of knowledge concerning the 
effectiveness of mental health treatment is not nearly 
advanced enough to permit specification of the ana- 
lytical form of the mental health cost function, or to 
characterize the long-term consequences of intensive, 
high-quality treatment. 
There is an alternative approach to the analysis of 
this problem, however, that can take one much closer 
to empirical reality. It is possible to represent the 
mental health delivery system by means of computer 
simulation models, and to test the consequences of 
changes in quality delivery through changes in the 
model parameters. This approach still requires 
simplifications in the definition of “quality” and 
in the representation of different treatment types, 
but it does afford a more detailed analysis of patient 
courses through the health care system than is 
available through functional analysis alone. 
At the Mental Health Research Institute at the 
University of Michigan, we have developed a number 
of stochastic models of community mental health 
services that permit the introduction of a great deal 
of empirical realism. These models provide for a 
variety of different types of treatment centers, and 
permit evaluation of the interdependencies among 
these centers. They also distinguish among different 
levels of severity or stage of illness within each 
treatment center. At the core of these models is a 
matrix of Markov transition probabilities that de- 
scribe the likelihoods with which patients change 
illness severity or treatment location. These proba- 
bilities have been inferred both from actual patient 
movements within community mental health systems 
in Michigan and from the judgments of clinicians and 
evaluators with experience in the field. These proba- 
bilities can be made to vary with changes in per- 
patient treatment expenditures, and the resulting 
system can be used as a simulation of what might 
happen if these changes in treatment expenditure 
were actually made. 
For the purposes of this paper, a simple simulation 
model was developed using as its providers a pair of 
outpatient centers, two community residential facili- 
ties, and two different types of inpatient setting. The 
object of the simulation was to investigate the impact 
on overall system cost of increased expenditure on 
treatment quality in one of the outpatient facilities. 
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Fig. 2. Outpatient cost as a function of treatment quality. 
Specific questions raised by the analysis in this paper 
are: 
(1) is it possible for increases in treatment quality 
expenditure to reduce mental health care costs? 
(2) if increases in treatment quality expenditure do 
reduce costs, are the cost reductions received by the 
treatment center that delivers the treatment, or are 
these benefits primarily received elsewhere? 
(3) do increases in treatment quality tend to in- 
crease system costs at low levels but decrease costs at 
higher levels? 
The simulations suggest affirmative answers to all 
three of these questions, but they suggest that by far 
the most important impediment to efficient quality 
delivery is embodied in the second: the fact that the 
benefits from improved treatment quality are recieved 
by centers other than the one providing enhanced 
services. Figures 2 and 3 below describe typical 
simulation outcomes. On the horizontal axes of the 
figures is a scale factor that indexes changes in 
treatment quality in one of the two outpatient set- 
tings. A value of 1.0 corresponds to the estimate of 
current practice. On the vertical axis of Fig. 2 is the 
total cost of that outpatient center: not surprisingly, 
this cost is almost perfectly proportional to the level 
of treatment quality. On the vertical axis of Fig. 3 are 
total system costs-including the expenses of the 
high-quality outpatient center that it contains. These 
costs are by no means proportional to the level of 
treatment quality in the outpatient center, and in fact 
10.4 - 
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Fig. 3. System cost as a function of treatment quality. 
they are strongly decreasing over most of the range 
of the simulation. Moreover, the decrease extends 
well beyond the point corresponding to current prac- 
tice. It is clear, however, that those who manage the 
outpatient center have no incentive to deliver these 
increases in quality: the savings in system costs are 
generated only from increases in outpatient ex- 
penditures. At the simulated value of the rtutl(s quo, 
every dollar spent on improved outpatient treatment 
reduces system costs by 2 dollars (and since the 
outpatient cost is included in the system cost, that 
means that every dollar spent in the outpatient setting 
saves 3 dollars elsewhere). Unless some means were 
found to shift these savings to the center that gener- 
ated them, no further improvement in treatment 
quality is likely to take place. 
The simulations also display the nonconvexity 
suggested by eqn (4), but the range of nonconvexity 
corresponds to quality levels that are lower than 
those that we have estimated to be available in 
practice-system costs do rise with increases in qual- 
ity at low levels, but the range is too small to show 
clearly on the scale of Fig. 3. This may, of course, be 
a reflection of optimism on the part of those who 
assisted in the establishment of the parameters of the 
model. In any case, this stands as a preliminary 
exercise, and its value is primarily that of showing 
that the nonconvexity is present in models that 
possess a good deal of empirical realism. 
5. SURSIDIZATION FOR EFFICIENCY 
The simulations suggest that various types of men- 
tal health service units are strongly interdependent 
because each influences the patient flows to each of 
the others. To the extent that the managements of 
these facilities focus on problems of cost and services 
delivery within their own units, this interdependence 
will be ignored, and the overall cost-effectiveness of 
the system will be severely impaired. The problem is 
not one of information: experienced managers are 
surely aware that their decisions affect the patient 
loads in other facilities. The problem is that each 
manager’s primary responsibility is the successful 
operation of one unit, and any system that evaluates 
the performance of a manager will reflect that fact. 
Even forceful demonstrations of the importance of 
the interdependence problem will not reorient the 
incentives that are leading to the inefficiency. 
One solution might be the integration of the 
entire mental health services system under one 
manager/director. Taking full account of the inter- 
dependence among facilities would then become part 
of the responsibility of this single individual. Un- 
fortunately, this approach does not solve the problem 
so much as it redefines it; how is the single director 
to create incentives in the system so as to induce unit 
managers (who must still exist) to operate as though 
they also cared about the interdependencies? In prac- 
tice, this is evidently very difficult, in that community 
mental health systems with managing directors still 
operate more or less as collections of autonomous 
service units. 
One interesting way to address this problem is to 
introduce a standard economic device: within the 
context of traditional market economies, it is often 
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suggested that external interdependencies of this sort 
may be corrected by instituting systems of taxes and 
subsidies that reflect the external costs or benefits. 
Such a scheme would entail the creation of a “quality 
subsidy” where each treatment center is paid an extra 
sum that is proportional to the rate of quality deliv- 
ery. The funding agency would invent a subsidy rate 
that approximated as closely as possible a value Si for 
each provider i, where 
Si E - C (PI + qQj)f+(S 1. (14) 
J#i 
The subsidy S, is equal to the aggregated cost 
savings to agencies other than i that are realized when 
i increases its quality per patient day by one unit. If 
agency i is granted this subsidy, then its cost function 
becomes: 
Ci = (pi + qQi)_P<B) - SiQiv (15) 
and it is easy to see that if such a subsidy is granted 
to each treatment center, and if each follows a cost 
minimizing quality choice, then these decisions 
togther will satisfy the efficiency condition in 
eqn (12). 
Subsidization of mental health services by various 
government agencies and programs is common 
practice, but to the author’s knowledge, none of them 
attempt to approximate S, as it is defined in eqn (14). 
Instead, they are inclined to subsidize the inputs to 
quality, such as staff or accommodations. This state 
of affairs is easy to understand: quality per patient- 
day is much more difficult to measure objectively 
than are expenditures on staff or facilities, and correct 
estimation of Si requires an analysis of mental health 
systems that is sufficient to support quantification of 
the interdependence problem. 
Understandable as this choice of subsidies may be, 
it is not at all efficient. Indeed, the point of the 
argument here is that the provision of quality per 
patient-day is not the same as total resources devoted 
to quality, and that the two may actually move in 
opposite directions. Inputs to quality do not vary in 
proportion to Qi but in proportion to Q,f’(Q). 
Indeed, as Qi is increased, the mean duration of stay, 
y(Q) decreases (because of the negative slope of the 
function f), and therefore the product QJi(Q) 
increases less rapidly than does Qi alone. In short, a 
subsidy on the inputs to quality will encourage 
providers to deliver less quality than they would if the 
subsidy were directed at Qi alone. 
A further pitfall to providing subsidies to the 
inputs to quality is that there is no assurance that 
they will be used efficiently. In effect, subsidies on 
inputs reward treatment centers for displacing other 
resources with the subsidized inputs in a way that 
minimizes the improvement in treatment quality (that 
is, in a way that minimizes the reduction in treatment 
duration). 
Finally, no subsidy system can work without facil- 
ity managers with strong incentives toward cost 
minimization. This requirement may be severely com- 
promised in the present-day climate of medical cost 
reimbursement plans. If costs are recovered in any 
case, there is no cost-reduction incentive system in 
force, and a managerial preference for large staff and 
facilities will conflict with efficient service delivery. 
Moreover, under many existing financing schemes, 
the subsidy would simply replace a portion of some 
cost-covering reimbursement, and the incentive struc- 
ture faced by agency managers would be unaffected. 
Indeed, cost-reimbursement plans currently in place 
have perverse incentive effects: they subsidize staff 
levels and capacity expenditures while ignoring qual- 
ity per patient-day, and the consequent incentives to 
increase the former will not in general lead to efficient 
delivery of the latter. 
If a community mental health system is composed 
of private or publicly subsidized private facilities 
whose fees are determined by some approximately 
competitive market process, then the subsidy mech- 
anism might be used effectively. The provision of 
outpatient service, for example, frequently does con- 
form reasonably closely to these required conditions. 
Other mental health facilities (voluntary and in- 
voluntary inpatient facilities, “halfway houses,” and 
other residential facilities) do not by any means meet 
these conditions, and the general problems of quality 
service delivery remain in place. In these cases, cen- 
tralized management of their services, together with 
an internal evaluation and pricing system that incor- 
porates the effects of interdependence may be the 
only practical means for maintaining an efficient and 
effective mental health delivery system. 
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